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1 Preface
Last year the known plaintext only attack on RSA using Chinese Remainder
Theorem (RSA-CRT) with Montgomery multiplication was presented in [3]
by Martin Hlaváč. The special implementation of RSA allows an attacker
to reveal side channel information, a number of final subtractions during
Montgomery exponentiation. Hlaváč converted the retrieved information to
Hidden Number Problem (HNP) and solved it by lattices, especially LLL
algorithm [6]. His approach requested at least four bits of precision for the
individual observations for a RSA-1024 instance.
In the same year, Adi Akavia [1] introduced an algorithm solving HNP
with only one bit oracle. Her approach is based on finding significant Fourier
transform (SFT) coefficients of function f from Z to Zp, i.e. elements α ∈ Zp
(with p prime) such that |f̂(α)|2 ≥ τL2(f)
2, where f̂ is a discrete Fourier
transform of the function f and τ ∈ [0, 1] is known. She presented a SFT
algorithm over Zp and later, Serge Vaudenay [12] optimized and extended it
in order to work in arbitrary Abelian group ZN . He also proposed
an algorithm for finding only a single significant Fourier coefficient.
This work builds on Hlaváč’s approach using the SFT algorithm by Akavia.
In our scenario, for RSA instance with N = pq, the side channel gives us
access to the function f(x) = MSMB(xq mod N) (Most Significant Modu-
lar Bit). This oracle outputs the correct value with probability at least 95%.
Since q is a significant coefficient of f , the function f̂ has very “nice” proper-
ties. This allows us to improve general Vaudenay’s SFT algorithm. We also
propose a new algorithm for finding a single SFT coefficient for this spe-
cial case of the function f . The main advantage of both algorithms is that
they can work with only one bit oracle and also even if the oracle to f
is corrupted by “small” random noise. All of these observations lead to
an adaptive chosen plaintext attack on RSA-CRT with Montgomery
multiplication.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 contains theoretical back-
ground of the SFT (mainly based on Vaudenay [12]). Especially, it focuses
on the special case of the function f(x) = MSMB(xq mod N). An improved
version of Vaudenay’s algorithm and our new SFT algorithm are presented.
In Section 3, we describe RSA-CRT with Montgomery multiplication and
the side channel information which we can be acquired from this specific
implementation of RSA. Finally, in Section 4, we present practical results.
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2 Searching for SFT coefficients
Assume we have a function f and the goal is to find significant Fourier
transform coefficients α ∈ ZN such that |f̂(α)|
2 ≥ τL2(f)
2 for τ ∈ [0, 1].
By appropriate choice of the function f these results help us to factorize
the number N = pq for a specific instance of RSA.
2.1 Preliminaries
Convention: Throughout this work we denote the set of positive integers
as N, i.e. without considering 0 to be an element of N.













For ease of notation we will write θ instead of θN whenever it is possible.





0, if x 6= y
N , if x = y
Proof. In the case x 6= y, the sum is given by a geometric sequence with






Since θN = 1, we see that the numerator is equal to 0. On the other hand,
if x = y, we have
∑
α∈ZN
1 = N .





Proof. Applying Definition 2.2 of θp and the fact that cos(x) is an even and



























































Definition 2.6. For N ∈ N, α ∈ ZN and complex functions f , g over ZN ,
we define



























Lemma 2.7 (Fourier transform decomposition). Let N ∈ N and f be

































0, if x 6= y
N , if x = y







Lemma 2.8 (Parseval identity). Let N ∈ N and f be a complex function





Lemma 2.9. Let N ∈ N, α ∈ ZN and f , g be complex functions over ZN .
Then
f̂ ⊗ g(α) = f̂(α) ĝ(α)
Proof. See [2].
Theorem 2.10 (Chernoff-Hoeffding bound). Let X1, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. com-














Definition 2.11. Complex functions f and g are asymptotically equivalent,







2.2 Significant Fourier Transform
Adi Akavia presented new algorithm [1] to find significant Fourier transform
coefficients of a function f over Zp, when given oracle access to f . Later, Serge
Vaudenay optimized and extended Akavia’s algorithm to work in arbitrary
Abelian groups Zp1×· · ·×Zpk [12]. In this section we mostly present Akavia’s
and Vaudenay’s approach and improve some of the bounds, as well.
First, we define function SL. We show how it looks and prove several
of its properties. We denote weight of element α as |f̂(α)|2 and weight of
an interval I(c, δ) (interval in ZN which is centered around c and has length




This section leads to an estimate of interval weight. We also introduce
expression w̄(c, δ) which is defined on ZN but has “similar values” as w(c, δ)
on I(c, δ). Finally, we prove theorem on W̄(c, δ), an estimate of w̄(c, δ) given
by Chernoff-Hoeffding.
Convention: If not stated otherwise, p, q ∈ N denote two prime num-
bers and N = pq. We call this collection of parameters a RSA instance
I = (p, q,N).



































































































































which can be applied to |SL(α)|
2 (Lemma 2.13) where ϕ = πLα
N





































Figure 1: The function |SL(α)|





Corollary 2.15. Let I be an instance, L ∈ ZN \ {0} and α ∈ ZN . Then
|SL(α)| is an even function.














Corollary 2.16. The function |SL(α)|
2 is even by previous Corollary, as
well.
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Lemma 2.17. Let I be an instance, L ∈ ZN \ {0} and α ∈ ZN . Then















for α ∈ ZN
and |SL(α)|







(1) By the definition of SL(α) is the arithmetic mean of unitary complex
numbers.





















are N -periodic, so


























. On the other hand for
x ∈ [−N
2
























x ≤ sin x for x ∈ [0, π
2
]
Proof. The function sinx
x
for x ∈ [0, π
2
] is decreasing, the smallest
value is 2
π
when x = π
2
.






























































































































Remark 2.18. As we will see later, the bound (2) from the previous Lemma
is useful for “big” |α| while the bound (1) is convenient for α close to 0.







































































































Proof. We divide the sum from the definition of w̄(c,N/L) into two parts.






































θcx, if 0 ≤ x < L
0, otherwise
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Lemma 2.25. Let I be an instance, L ∈ ZN \ {0} and α, c ∈ ZN . Then
ĥc(α) = SL(c− α)





















θ(c−α)x = SL(c− α)










f(x− y)f(x− z) θc(y−z)























































f(x− y)f(x− z) θc(y−z)




and θcz = θ−cz.
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Lemma 2.27. Let I be an instance and L ∈ ZN , further let A, resp. B and C
be mutually independent random variables on ZN , resp. ZL and f be a com-
plex function over ZN with |f(x)| ≤ 1 for all x ∈ ZN and c ∈ ZN . Then for
Xi ∼ f(A − B)f(A− C)θ
c(B−C) where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the following statements
hold
(1) X1, . . . ,Xn are i.i.d. complex random variables
(2) X1, . . . ,Xn are bounded by 1, i.e. |Xi| ≤ 1
(3) expected value µ of Xi is w̄(c,N/L)
(Remark that X ∼ Y means that X and Y have the same distibution.)
Proof.
(1) X1, . . . ,Xn are independent and since they are generated in the same
way, they are also identically distributed.
(2) As |f(x)| ≤ 1 and |θc(Bi−Ci)| = 1, so |Xi| ≤ 1.




















Theorem 2.28. Let I be an instance, L ∈ ZN \{0}, c ∈ ZN , γ ∈ R and f be







f(Ai − Bi)f(Ai − Ci) θ
c(Bi−Ci)
)





on ZN resp. ZL. Then the estimate W̄(c,N/L) is ”good”, i.e.
Pr[| W̄(c,N/L)− w̄(c,N/L)| ≥ γ] ≤ 2ε
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Proof. By Lemma 2.27 (2), we have
∣∣∣f(Ai − Bi)f(Ai − Ci) θc(Bi−Ci)
∣∣∣ ≤ 1 for
all i ∈ [1, n], as well. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2.10 by Chernoff-
Hoeffding. We see that w̄(c,N/L) is an expected value for W̄(c,N/L) by
Lemma 2.27 (3), thus
Pr[| W̄(c,N/L)− w̄(c,N/L)| ≥ γ] ≤ 2e−2nγ
2
= 2ε
2.3 Special case of the function f
Recall that we are trying to find the factor q of N = pq in a particular in-
stance of RSA. In this section we will consider functions g(x) = xq mod N ,
f ′(x) = MSMB(g(x)) as the Most Significant Modular Bit of g(x), and also
the function f(x) = f ′(x)− 1/2. The function f ′, as shown later, emerges as
a side channel from an attack on specific implementation of the RSA algo-
rithm. We focus on values of the function f ′ which will help us to find the
factor q of N .
In order to find q we will use Significant Fourier Transform (SFT) algo-
rithm. This algorithm for given τ ∈ [0, 1] outputs all τ -significant coefficients
α of the function f ′, i.e. all α ∈ ZN such that |f̂(α)|
2 ≥ τL2(f)
2. In this
section we prove (besides some technical lemmas) a few properties of the
functions f ′ and f , especially we compute their L2 norms and their discrete
Fourier transforms in particular points. We will use these results to prove
that the weight |f̂(kq)|2 of odd multiples of q is significantly bigger than the
weight of other points α ∈ ZN and the weight of q is the biggest one. This
result theoretically justifies the validity of the SFT algorithm.
We have decided to choose a function f instead of f ′ in SFT algorithm.




unlike the function f where 0 has weight 0 in limit case for p → ∞. In
searching for significant coefficient we are not interested in finding 0, but q.
Definition 2.29 (Most Significant Modular Bits). For an instance I, x ∈ ZN






For l = 1, we will write MSMB(x) instead of MSMB1,N (x).
Observation 2.30. Let I be an instance. Then we can write
(a) for x ∈ ZN MSMB1,N(x) =
{
0, if x < N/2
1, otherwise
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(b) for x ∈ Zp MSMB1,N(xq) =
{
0, if x < p/2
1, otherwise
Definition 2.31. For an instance I, we define functions g : Z → ZN ,
f ′ : Z → {0, 1} and f : Z → {−1/2, 1/2} as follows
g(x) = xq mod N
f ′(x) = MSMB(g(x))
f(x) = MSMB(g(x))− 1/2
Lemma 2.32. Let I be an instance. Then the function g is p-periodic on Z.
Proof.
g(x+ p) = ((x+ p) q) mod N = (xq + pq) mod N = xq mod N = g(x)
Corollary 2.33. Let I be an instance. Then functions f ′ and f are p-periodic
on Z, as well.

















































































































































































Lemma 2.36. Let I be an instance. Then




(b) |f̂(0)| = 1
2p
Proof. Using the result from technical Lemma 2.34 for α = 0 and applying
Observation 2.30 and ⌊p/2⌋ = p−1
2























































































































Lemma 2.38. Let I be an instance, F be a p-periodic function and β 6= kq
for all k ∈ N. Then
|F̂ (β)| = 0














































Finally, we apply β 6= kq. Notice
q−1∑
j=0











Corollary 2.39. Since f is p-periodic, |f̂(β)| = 0 for all β 6= kq, k ∈ Z.














Proof. The sum is given by a geometric sequence with the same quotient






































, for t even
− 1
πit
, for t odd
21






















= 1 for numerator and denominator when t
is even and denominator when t is odd and finally, limp→∞ e
πit
p = 1.























































, for k odd





















































































































Now, applying Lemma 2.41 for t = −k and t = k we get




























































0, for k even
1
(kπ)2
, for k odd


































element α ∈ ZN
Figure 2: Values |f̂(α)|2 for α ∈ ZN
In Figure 2 there are elements α from ZN and the corresponding discrete
Fourier transform |f̂(α)|2. The element with the biggest weight for the func-




want to find q, so we have decided to choose a function f instead of f ′ in
SFT algorithm.
2.4 Algorithms for finding a significant coefficient
In this section we introduce two algorithms for finding a significant coefficient
of function f(x) = MSMB(xq mod N) − 1/2. Both of them assume that
we have an access to an oracle Of for function f , i.e. for arbitrary x ∈ Z
we choose the oracle outputs the value f(x). Thus the attack we will describe
is a chosen plaintext attack. In practice Of arises from the observations
of a side channel in an RSA implementation as shown in Section 3. Notice
that our goal is to find only one significant coefficient, namely q. Therefore we
narrow down the searching interval from [0, N ] to [2Nbits/2−1, 2Nbits/2] (Nbits is
a number of bits of N) which contains q and no other significant coefficients
of f (we show that this is an appropriate choice).
The first algorithm we present originates from Serge Vaudenay [12]. We
improve the idea of this algorithm and some technical conditions to be faster
than the original one.
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Moreover, we bring a new algorithm for finding one significant coefficient.
This algorithm (as well as the Vaudenay’s one) is based on the properties
of the discrete Fourier transform of the function f . It uses the results from
the previous sections.
Convention:
Since in all applications of our algorithms presented in the thesis, all numbers
p, q and N are large, we will make an assumption that |f̂(x)|2 given by the
instance I containing (p, q,N) is “almost equal” to limp→∞ |f̂(x)|
2. Indeed,
for self-standing |f̂(x)|2 the rounding error of this replacement is at most 1
4p2





2 where the error is added p-times, so
it cumulates for at most p · 1
4p2
which is still “almost 0” for p being a 512-bit
long number.
2.4.1 Searching interval
In our scenario, where p, q ∈ N are prime numbers, N = pq, Nbits is a number
of bits of N , we want to narrow down the searching interval to contain q and
no other significant coefficients of f . Appropriate choice of the interval is
[2Nbits/2−1, 2Nbits/2], as implemented in the OpenSSL [10].
2.4.2 Approximate GCD
In searching of q we will use Approximate GCD algorithm, in short AGCD
by Howgrave-Graham [5]. He described how to find GCD of two numbers,
from which first we know exactly and we have an estimate for the second one.
Algorithm is based on lattices using LLL algorithm [6] by Lenstra–Lenstra–
Lovász. We will use AGCD to find GCD(N, q′) where q′ is an estimate of q.
Lemma 2.45. Let N = pq and q′ = q + x where |x| ≤ N
4
. Then there exists
polynomial time algorithm AGCD satisfying
AGCD(N, q′) = GCD(N, q)
Proof. See [5].
Observation 2.46. In the limit case it is possible to find q by AGCD(N, q′)
even for |x| = N
4
, but the lattice in LLL algorithm needs to be very large. On
the other hand, with lattice size 5× 5, the appropriate choice for bound of |x|
is 2⌈0.195Nbits⌉. For 1024 bit modulus N it means |q − q′| < 2200 and for 2048
bit the bound is 2400.
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2.4.3 Computing W̄(c,N/L)
Since f is a real function, oracle Of is real, too. When we use only the real


























c (Bi − Ci)
)
This simple observation speeds up the algorithm by factor 2.
Algorithm 1 Computing W̄(c,N/L)
Input: N , ε, γ, oracle Of , interval [a, b]
Output: W̄(c,N/L) satisfying Theorem 2.28 with probability 2ε




, L = ⌈ N
b−a+1
⌉ and c = ⌊a+b
2
⌋
2: pick A1, . . . , An uniformly from ZN
3: pick B1, . . . , Bn uniformly from ZL









c (Bi − Ci)
)
2.4.4 Estimating |SL(c− q)|
2
If we restrict the searching interval to interval that contains only q and no
other multiples of q, then in every level of the algoritm we can estimate
the value |SL(c − q)|
2 for given N,L and c using W̄(c,N/L) (see the idea
below). This information is useful for finding inteval(s) where q, our singifi-
cant coefficient, is located. The value |SL(c−q)|
2 is equal to |SL(α)|
2 for some
α ∈ [0, N/2] (and −α ∈ [−N/2, 0]). If we focus on finding α (for example, by
binary search), we can easily calculate q = c− α.
The finding of the estimate of |SL(c − q)|
2 is based on properties of the
function f̂ , especially
• |f̂(0)|2 = 0 (Corollary 2.37)
• |f̂(β)|2 = 0 for β 6= kq (Corollary 2.39)
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• |f̂(kq)|2 = 0 for k even and
• |f̂(kq)|2 = 1
(kπ)2
for k odd (Lemma 2.43)












































We want to estimate |c−3q|2N from above, so we consider the smallest possible
value: c = 2Nbits/2 and 3q = 3.2Nbits/2−1 = 2Nbits/2 + 2Nbits/2−1. Now we have












































































































Theorem 2.48. Let I be an instance, L ∈ ZN \ {0}, c ∈ [2
Nbits/2−1, 2Nbits/2]





. Further, let ε, γ are chosen parameters as in Theorem
2.28 and W̄(c,N/L) is computed from i.i.d. variables. Then the following
holds with probability 1− 2ε































and since |W̄(c,N/L)− w̄(c,N/L)| ≤ γ, i.e.
W̄(c,N/L)− γ ≤ w̄(c,N/L) ≤ W̄(c,N/L) + γ








W̄(c,N/L)− γ − Ω ≤ |f̂(q)|2|SL(c− q)|
2 ≤ W̄(c,N/L) + γ







Corollary 2.49. For an instance I, L ∈ ZN \ {0}, c ∈ [2
Nbits/2−1, 2Nbits/2]















Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.47 and Corollary 2.44 (|f̂(q)|2 = 1
π2
).
Remark 2.50. Notice that for calculating the lower and the upper bounds
of |SL(c− q)|
2 (Corollary 2.49) we do not need to know prime numbers p, q,
we only need to know N,L, c, ε and γ. We will use this knowledge because it
is very useful for our attack.
2.4.5 Intervals containing q
As we showed above, from computing W̄(c,N/L) we can estimate |SL(c−q)|
2.
Now, we can continue even further. From bounds on |SL(c− q)|
2 we compute
bounds on |c−q| (for example by binary search) and since we know the value c,
we can determine interval(s) in which q lies.
Algorithm 2 Interval(s) containing q intq()
Input: N , ε, γ, L ∈ ZN , c ∈ ZN , W̄ = W̄(c,N/L) for interval [a, b]
Output: interval(s) where q lies





2: Bl = (W̄ − γ − Ω) π
2, Bu = (W̄ + γ) π2 // Bl ≤ |SL(c− q)|
2 ≤ Bu
3: ξ = SL2inv(Bl), η = SL2inv(B
u)
4: if η = 0 then
5: int = {[c− ξ, c+ ξ]}
6: else
7: int = {[c− ξ, c− η], [c+ η, c+ ξ]}
8: end if
9: return int
In Algorithm 2, SL2inv is a function which finds |x| for value |SL(x)|
2.
When we start searching for q in interval [a, b], this algorithm outputs new
(smaller) interval(s) where q lies. If Bu, the upper bound on |SL(c − q)|
2,
is equal or greater than 1, the new interval is only one and it is situated







c− ξ q c c+ ξ
Figure 3: q-containing interval if the upper bound Bu ≥ 1
On the other hand, if the upper bound is less than 1, new intervals are







c− ξ q c− η c c+ η c+ ξ
Figure 4: q-containing intervals if the upper bound Bu < 1
2.4.6 Improved Vaudenay’s algorithm
The original Vaudenay’s algorithm is recursive. He proposed to enlarge the
searching interval by one third of its length (from δ to 4
3
δ) and split it into
three overlapping intervals of size 2
3
δ centered at points − δ
3
, 0 and δ
3
relative
to the center of the original interval. Then in each subinterval he calculated
W̄(c,N/L) where c is the center point of the subinterval and finally picked
that one with the biggest W̄ to continue recursively on this subinterval. Since
Vaudenay’s algorithm has not been published yet, we have decided not to
describe it in more details.
We bring a new insight to this algorithm. Instead of picking one interval
from three subintervals based on the maximum value of W̄, we calculate an
estimate of |SL(c− q)|
2 for each of this three subintervals and find intervals,
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where q, our significant coefficient, may lie (Algorithm 2). Finally, we inter-
sect these potentionally q-containing intervals and continue bt searching only
on the intersection. At the end the searching interval is so small that we can
easily find q by Howgrave-Graham’s AGCD algorithm [5].
As we will show in Section 4, the new approach of Vaudenay’s algorithm
is about five times faster than the original one.
Algorithm 3 Improved Vadenay’s algorithm for finding a single SFT
Input: N , ε, γ, oracle Of , interval [a, b] where a = 2
Nbits
2
−1 , b = 2
Nbits
2
Output: singnificant coefficient q




, l = 0.195Nbits
2: while |b− a| > 2l do
3: δ = b− a+ 1, L = ⌈N
δ
⌉
4: for i = 1 to 3 do
5: ai = a+ ⌊
δ
6
(2i− 3)⌋, bi = a+ ⌈
δ
6
(2i+ 1)⌉ − 1




7: W̄ = W̄(ci, N/L) // Alg. 1 for interval [ai, bi]
8: inti = intq(W̄) // Alg. 2 for W̄(ci, N/L)
9: end for














Figure 5: In one iteration of improved Vaudenay’s algorithm three values W̄




Now, we will describe a new algorithm for finding a significant coefficient
of function f . It is recursive, as well. In the first iteration we start with





⌉. In each step we compute one W̄(c,N/L) on every input interval.
Using Algorithm 2 we get potentionally q-containing subinterval(s). Finally,
we intersect these subintervals with all intervals we have got so far. Input
intervals for the next step are all intervals in this intersection. As in previous
algorithm at the end we use AGCD.
We use in new algorithm:
- intIn, intOut are arrays of intervals
- function len means the length of array, i.e. count of intervals in intIn
- function intersection finds interval(s) - the intersection of two interval
arrays, i.e. x is in this intersection if and only if x is at least one interval
from the first array and at least one interval from second array
- function indexW̄max finds such index j for which W̄j is the biggest
Algorithm 4 New algorithm for finding a single SFT
Input: N , ε, γ, oracle Of , interval [a, b] where a = 2
Nbits
2
−1 , b = 2
Nbits
2
Output: singnificant coefficient q




, l = 0.195Nbits
2: intIn = {[a, b]}
3: repeat
4: intOut = {}
5: for i = 0 to len(intIn)− 1 do
6: [a, b] = intIn[i]
7: ci = ⌊
a+b
2
⌋, L = ⌈ N
b−a+1
⌉
8: W̄i = W̄(ci, N/L) // Alg. 1 for interval [a, b]
9: intOut = intOut ∪ intq(W̄i) // Alg. 2 for W̄(ci, N/L)
10: end for
11: intIn = intersection(intIn, intOut)
12: until for each [a, b] ∈ intIn: b− a < 2l
13: j = indexW̄max(W̄0, . . . , W̄i) // W̄j = max0≤k≤i W̄k
14: return AGCD(N, cj)
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2.4.8 Technical improvements
There are a few improvements that can increase efficiency of our algorithms.
Their description follows.
Improvement 1
In both algorithms we compute bounds on |SL(c−q)|
2 for interval [a, b] where
c is the centre. Notice that if q ∈ [a, b] then |SL(c − q)|
2 has to be greater
than 4
π2
since points with the smallest value of |SL(c − x)|
2 are a = c − N
2L
and b = c+ N
2L





Thus we can take this into account in our algorithms, i.e. when the upper
bound on |SL(c − q)|
2 is smaller than 4
π2
, we omit the interval [a, b] in the
next steps of algorithms.
Now, we focus on improved Vaudenay’s algorithm. We can afford to decrease
the number n of summands (i.e. side channel observations) in computation
of W̄(c,N/L) (see Algorithm 1), so that the algorithm will be faster. This
may cause the estimates on |SL(c − q)|
2 to be “bad”. To handle problems
with bad estimates we propose to add two new heuristic features described
in Improvements 2 and 3.
Improvement 2 (Heuristic)
A bad estimate can cause the intersection in step 10 in Algorithm 3 to be
empty. When this happens we decide to repeat the same iteration again.
Improvement 3 (Heuristic)
Due to a bad estimate, the computation can get into an impasse, i.e. the
intersection in step 10 in Algorithm 3 may not contain q, so consequently
in the next iteration, q is not in the input interval [a, b]. In this iteration
all bounds on |SL(c − q)|
2 will be smaller than 4
π2
for the same reason as
described in Improvement 1. After recognizing that, we return one iteration
back.
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3 RSA-CRT algorithm and the Side Channel
RSA is an algorithm for public-key cryptography published in 1977 by Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. The current version [9] is available
in PKCS #1 standard v2.1 . It is based on difficulty to factorize a big number
to the product of its divisors.
In this section we present an implementation of RSA with Montgomery
multiplication using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). We also show
the side channel which can be revealed from the specific instance of RSA,
originally described by Hlaváč. In his article [3], he presented known plain-
text only attack with the side channel using lattices, especially solving Hidden
Number Problem (HNP) by LLL algorithm [6]. On the other hand, motivated
by Akavia [1], we describe adaptive chosen plaintext attack by solving HNP
with finding SFT coefficient.
We will use Tomoeda’s notation while describing RSA-CRT and Mont-
gomery operations.
3.1 RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplication
Definition 3.1. Let p, q ∈ N be two different randomly chosen prime num-
bers, modulus N = pq and Euler funtion φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1). Further let
e ∈ N satisfy e ∈ (1, φ(N)) and GCD(e, φ(N)) = 1 and d ∈ N from interval
(1, φ(N)) with the following condition d = e−1 mod φ(N). Then, we define
- (N, e) as RSA public key and
- (N, d) as RSA private key
Prime numbers p and q are chosen by an appropriate way, for example,
difference |p − q| should be large enough, numbers p − 1 and q − 1 should
have at least one big factor, etc. At present, modulus N of length at least
1024 bits is used.
3.1.1 RSA signing using CRT
For a given message m, the RSA signature is computed by the operation
s = md mod N
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In RSA using CRT we first define dp = d mod (p− 1), dq = d mod
(q − 1), mp = m mod (p− 1), mq = m mod (q − 1) and pinv = p
−1 mod q





s = ((sq − sp)pinv mod q)p+ sp
3.1.2 Montgomery Exponentiation
Montgomery exponentiation is used in calculating sp and sq for its quickness.
First, numbers are converted to the Montgomery representation and instead




⌉. It is very fast in the binary representation. Definition of Mont-
gomery representation of integers and algorithms of multiplication and expo-
nentiation follow.
Definition 3.2. For instance I and R = 2⌈
Nbits
2
⌉ we define Montgomery
representation µ(x) of x ∈ Zp as follows
µ(x) = xR mod p
Lemma 3.3. Let I be an instance and x, y ∈ Zp. Then µ(xq) = µ(x) ∗µ(y),
where a ∗ b = abR−1 mod p is Montgomery multiplication.
Proof.
µ(x) ∗ µ(y) = (xR) mod p ∗ (yR) mod p = (xR)(yR)R−1 mod p
= xyR mod p = µ(xy)
Algorithm 6 is a binary exponentiation with help of Montgomery repre-
sentation of integers. Dummy operation in step 8 is a prevention of Single
Power Analysis (SPA) attack. Correctness of the Algorithm 5 is described
in [7]. The sixth step is called Final Subtraction (FS). We assume it is pos-
sible to obtain the amount of FS during one operation mont(z,z,p) and we
consider this information as the side channel for our attack.
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Algorithm 5 Montgomery multiplication mont()
Input: x, y ∈ Zp
Output: v = xyR−1 mod p // x, y, v are in Montgomery representation
1: s = xy
2: t = s(−p−1) mod R
3: g = s+ tp
4: v = g/R
5: if v > p then
6: v = v − p // FS - final subtraction
7: end if
8: return v
Algorithm 6 Montgomery exponentation expmont()
Input: m, p, d = (dn−1dn−2 . . . d1d0)2
Output: x = md mod p
1: u = mR mod p
2: z = u
3: for i = n− 2 to 0 do
4: z = mont(z, z, p)
5: if di == 1 then
6: z = mont(z, u, p)
7: else
8: z′ = mont(z, u, p) // dummy multiplication
9: end if
10: end for
11: z = mont(z, 1, p)
12: return z
3.2 The Side Channel
In this part we describe the side channel. It leads to the function f(x) =
MSMB(xq mod N) and it is based on Tomoeda’s estimate [11] for the
number ni of FS and consequently on Hlaváč’s conversion described in [3].
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3.2.1 Tomoeda’s estimate
Observation 3.4. For p, q ∈ N prime numbers, N = pq, message m ∈ ZN
and k observations, consider ni as #FS in operation (mp,i)
d
p mod p, where
mp,i = mi mod N and i ∈ [1, k]. Further, let nmax = max1≤i≤k ni, nmin =







Lemma 3.5. For parameters from the previous lemma and substitutions
ti = miR mod N and ui =
ni−nmin
nmax−nmin
N , we obtain
tiq ≈ ui (mod N)
Proof. There exists ki ∈ Z such that miR mod p = miR − kip. Then we
multiply the whole approximation by N




When we substitute ti = miR mod N and ui =
ni−nmin
nmax−nmin




tiq ≈ ui (mod N)
3.2.3 Our side channel
If we are able to obtain the total number of FS during the exponentiation
m
dp
p mod p, then since tiq ≈ ui (mod N), we can choose a function MSMB
for which it holds
MSMB(tiq mod N) ≈ MSMB(ui mod N)
We define a function f ′(x) = MSMB(xq mod N) and set our oracle as fol-
lows. When someone “asks” for the value f ′(ti) = MSMB(tiq mod N) the
oracle will answer the known value MSMB(ui mod N) instead of the uknown
value MSMB(tiq mod N). In practice they are equal with probability 95.8%
(see 4.1) for 1024 bit long RSA modulus. The choice of MSMB function is
very convenient for the SFT algorithm. Let us remind that we use function
f(x) = MSMB(xq mod N)− 1/2 instead of f ′(x).
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In the Algorithm 7 we show how the oracle Of answers the value
MSMB(ui mod N)− 1/2 for some ti. During the computation of ui we need
to know values nmin and nmax, the minimum and the maximum numbers of
FS during k observations. In practice nmin = 0 (see [3]) and as Primas showed




i=1 ni instead of nmax. First,
we let sign a few messages to get the average number of FS. In the Algorithm 7
the function montSign(mi) outputs the number of FS during RSA signing,
especially during Montgomery exponentiation m
dp
p,i mod p.
Algorithm 7 Oracle Of Of (ti)
Input: N,R = 2⌈
Nbits
2
⌉, ti ∈ ZN
Output: MSMB(tiq mod N)− 1/2 with probability 95.8%
1: mi = tiR
−1 mod N



















f(ti) = MSMB(tiq mod N) /o/o/o MSMB(ui mod N)
Figure 6: Oracle answer to the query ti
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3.2.4 Algorithms summary
For better understanding we will summarize all steps in both algorithms.
Suppose we have a blackbox which for message m outputs its RSA signature
s = me mod N for an unknown RSA instance. What we know about this
blackbox is that it uses Montgomery exponentiation for RSA signing and for
each message mi reveals ni, the number of FS during exponentiation modp.
For functionality of our oracle Of described in Algorithm 7 we need to
know navg, the average number of FS during k observations, so first we let our
blackbox sign k random messages (we apply k = 1000) and from n1, . . . , nk
compute navg as their mean. Now, for computation W̄, we can use oracle Of .
The second step is to run an algorithm for finding a single SFT coeffi-
cient, improved Vaudenay’s algorithm (see Alg. 3) or a new algorithm (see
Alg. 4) with our oracle Of . Besides the RSA public modulus N other input
parameters are ε and γ which come from Theorem 2.28. They have impact
on the precision we want in computation of W̄ and how many observations
are needed. The choice of these parameters we be discussed in subsection
4.4. During the SFT algorithm we can apply some technical improvements
descibed in subsection 2.4.8, especially Improvement 1 for both algorithms
to avoid cases where the current searching interval does not contain q, our
significant coefficient, or Improvements 2 and 3 for improved Vaudenay’s
algorithm to be faster.
We will stop the SFT algorithm when the searching interval(s) is(are) so
small that we can apply AGCD algorithm by Howgrave-Graham (see sub-
section 2.4.2) to find q.
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4 Practical results
After the theoretical part we present practical results. We look at probability
that our oracle works as we have expected and how long the computation of
W̄ takes for different lengths of n. We discuss the choice of input parameters
to the SFT algorithms. We also compare the relative amounts of time which
the algorithm spends by generating the side channel information and the rest
of the algorithm. We show the difference between the original Vaudenay’s
algorithm and its improvement that we have proposed. Finally, we present
time results of both algorithms.
For our experiments we used computer with Intel Core 2 Duo 3.00GHz.
The following results are for 1024 bit modulus N .
4.1 Probability which the oracle Of works with
First we present the probability of functionality of our oracle Of described
in Algorithm 7. For 10 instances of RSA we let sign 1000 random messages
and compute how many times the equation below holds
MSMB(tiq mod N) = MSMB(ui mod N)












Table 1: Functionality of oracle Of
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4.2 Duration of computing W̄ for different n
In the graph below we show how long the computation of W̄ takes for different
lengths of n. These results also affect the choice of input parameters to the




























Figure 7: Duration of computing W̄ for parameter n
4.3 The side channel generation vs. the SFT algorithm
The generation of the side channel information is very time consuming
operation, so that we are interested in finding out its proportion in the whole
algorithm running time. Of course, it depends on parameter n. For n = 300
it starts on 93% and it rising to 99.5% for n = 9300.
4.4 The choice of input parameters for SFT algorithm
There are two input parameters for the SFT algorithm, ε and γ. They affect n,





. Now, we remind where they occur and what they mean.
First of all, they come from Theorem 2.28. With little modification we
have
Pr[| W̄(c,N/L)− w̄(c,N/L)| < γ] > 1− 2ε
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Thus with probability (1 − 2ε), values W̄ and w̄ differ by less than γ. We
can set γ and ε very small, but then n is very large and as we have shown in
Table 2, it has a big impact on the amount of side channel measurements
and also on the duration of the algorithm.
On the other hand, we use γ in Algorithm 2 for estimate of |SL(c− q)|
2,
especially for its lower and upper bounds
Bl = (W̄ − γ − Ω) π
2, Bu = (W̄ + γ) π2
Because of the fact that the oracle Of does not give correct values in 100%
cases and also W̄ is calculated with probability (1 − 2ε), the value γ does
not have to be too small to cover these imprecisions. On the contrary, it also
may not be too large because in that case we get a big range for estimate of
|SL(c− q)|
2.
Finally, we have decided to set ε to 0.01, so the probability of correct
computation of W̄ is 98%. The reason is that even one bad estimate of
|SL(c− q)|
2 can destroy the SFT algorithm.
For fixed ε = 0.01, we consider acceptable γ from 0.01 to 0.02 (it sets the
range from 0.197 to 0.394 for estimate of |SL(c − q)|
2 when γ is multiplied













Table 2: Choosing parameters: γ and the corresponding n for fixed ε = 0.01
Other question is how fast the searching interval decreases during the
algorithm. Because of the different characters of mentioned algorithms and
the fact that computation of W̄’s takes at least 95% of the running time, we
have decided to define unit “bits/W̄” which represents number of bits that
are revealed during computation of one W̄. It is only analytical unit because
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very often it is neccessary to compute more W̄’s for one level of algorithm.
In the Table 3 we present bits/W̄ for different γ if our side channel is correct
in 100% cases.
Finally, we decided for the trade-off and set γ = 0.0155 yielding n = 9585.
bits/W̄
γ












Table 3: Values γ and the corresponding bits/W̄ for both algorithms
4.5 Original vs. improved Vaudenay’s algorithm
Now we show the difference between the original Vaudenay’s algorithm and
the improved one. For fixed ε, γ and consequently n we present the results
in unit bits/W̄ for 5 instances of RSA. It is seen that improved version of
Vaudenay’s algorithm for our special function f is about five times faster
than the original one. We also add the results for the new SFT algorithm
which is even a bit faster than the improved Vaudenay’s.
bits/W̄
RSA ins.
orig. Vaudenay’s impr. Vaudenay’s new SFT
1 0.196 1.019 1.067
2 0.197 1.013 1.064
3 0.193 1.000 1.071
4 0.195 1.006 1.060
5 0.195 1.006 1.046
mean 0.195 1.009 1.062
Table 4: Comparison of speed of decreasing the searching interval
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4.6 Timing results for improved Vaudenay’s algorithm
In the next two parts of the work we present the timing results of both
algorithms. The Figure 8 is for improved Vaudenay’s algorithms, further
the Figure 9 stands for the case when we have used heuristic improvements
described in 2.4.8 and the last one (Figure 10) represents timing results for
our new algorithm. From these results we see that the heuristic version of
improved Vaudenay’s algorithm is the fastest one, the whole attack takes only
about an hour. On the other hand, we notice that there is almost no time
difference between our new algorithm and the improved Vaudenay’s one. All
measurements are for 1024 bit RSA.
4.6.1 Improved Vaudenay’s algorithm
First, we present improved Vaudenay’s algorithm. During the computation
we used Improvement 1 from 2.4.8 and the Howgrave-Graham’s AGCD




















Figure 8: Timing results of improved Vaudenay’s algorithm for 1024-bit RSA
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4.6.2 Heuristically improved Vaudenay’s algorithm
We used Improvement 1, heuristic Improvements 2 and 3 from subsection
2.4.8 and also the AGCD algorithm. As the best option of decreased para-
meter n, the choice n/30 appears, so the total number of requested obser-
vations is reduced to 1/30. Since the parameter n is quite small, the whole


















Figure 9: Timing results of heuristic Vaudenay’s algorithm for 1024-bit RSA
4.7 Timing results for the new algorithm
Finally, we present results for our new algorithm. At the end the AGCD



















Figure 10: Timing results of new algorithm for 1024-bit RSA
The timing results of our new algorithm belong to the interval 23.5 - 24.5
with the mean 24 hours. There is no big difference between the mean of the
new algorithm and the mean of improved Vaudenay’s algorithm.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented an improved Vaudenay’s and a new algorithm for find-
ing a significant Fourier transform coefficient for one special function and
described its theoretical basis. We have shown how they can be applied for
an adaptive chosen plaintext attack on RSA-CRT signing using Montgomery
multiplication. We have also presented the practical results which imply that
improved Vaudenay’s algorithm is five times faster than the original one. By
several technical improvements for 1024 bit modulus, we have achieved the
running time of the algorithm to be only about an hour.
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